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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID J. ORR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030574-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from an order extending his probation imposed on convictions for 
one count of attempted securities fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-1 (2000), and one count of unlicensed broker-dealer, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 & § 61-1-21 (2000). This Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction over all criminal appeals involving convictions for third degree felonies. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the district court have jurisdiction to extend defendant's probation 
where a progress/violation report was filed three days before his original probation expired? 
Standard of Review: Whether a court has jurisdiction to revoke or extend probation 
is a matter of statutory construction and, therefore, a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Utah App. 1997). 
Issue No, 2: Is a finding that defendant had not fully paid his court-ordered 
restitution, a condition of his probation, a sufficient basis for extending defendant's 
probation? 
Standard of Review: Statute governs under what circumstances a court may extend 
probation. See State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 463-64 (Utah 1988). Accordingly, this issue 
also presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See Grate, 947 P.2d at 1164. 
Issue No. 3: May a district court extend probation beyond 3 6 months to the maximum 
amount of time that defendant could be incarcerated? 
Standard of Review: See standard of review for Issues 1 and 2. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.1 (2003).1 
1
 Because defendant was sentenced in May 2000, the applicable code provisions are 
those in effect in 2000. Although Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 has been amended since 
then, none of the amendments relate to the subsections applicable to this case. 
Accordingly, unless otherwise stated, this brief will cite to the 2003 version of the code. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND OF THE FACTS 
The charges 
Defendant was charged in a February 1999 information with ten counts of securities 
fraud, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2000), and nine 
counts of unlicensed broker-dealer, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
61-1-3,-21(2000). R2-6. 
According to the presentence investigation report (PSI), the charges were based on, 
among other things, defendant's material misrepresentations and omissions to investors, his 
operation of a Ponzi or Pyramid scheme,2 and his soliciting clients to invest in historic 
railroad bonds, which, as characterized by the Utah Division of Securities, was an "out and 
out fraud." PSI at 2-5. 
The guilty pleas 
On March 23, 2000, defendant pled guilty to one count each of attempted securities 
fraud and unlicensed broker-dealer, both third degree felonies. R20. In exchange for the 
pleas, the State dismissed all remaining charges in this and another case, agreed to not file 
any other charges based on defendant's conduct before his pleas, and agreed to recommend 
that defendant receive probation with four months jail time. R9. 
2In a Ponzi or Pyramid investment scheme, earlier investors receive returns from 
money invested by later investors. See PSI at 3. 
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The sentences 
On May 12,2000, the trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive prison terms 
of O-to-5 years. R22-23. The court suspended the prison terms and placed defendant on 
three years probation, on the condition that he serve six months in jail. R23. The court also 
ordered defendant to pay $ 1850.00 in fines and to pay restitution to his victims as a condition 
of his probation. R23. The court directed defendant "to pay no less than $1,000 per month 
towards restitution, or 25% of [his] income, under direction of AP&P." R24. Defendant's 
probation agreement incorporated the court's restitution order and payment schedule as 
special conditions of probation. R28-29. After a hearing, the trial court set the total 
restitution amount at $355,504.39. Rl 19-21, 170-71. 
Progress/Violation Reports 
First report. On January 2,2001, AP&P filed a progress/violation report alleging that 
defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by "being involved in an 
activity that involves money, investments or financial accounts" and "failing to be 
cooperative, compliant and truthful in all dealings with [AP&P]." R55-56,98-99. Based on 
the allegations in the report, the trial court issued an order to show cause. R60. 
On February 16, 2001, the parties reached an agreement in which the order to show 
cause was dismissed and a deadline set for AP&P to give an accounting of how much and 
to whom defendant's restitution payments had been disbursed. Rl 02-03. In this hearing, the 
trial court stated that "[probation will not terminate pending restitution being satisfied." 
R102-03. 
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Second report On July 1, 2002, AP&P filed a report with the court stating that 
defendant had been compliant with his probation agreement, including timely payment of 
$ 15080 per month towards his restitution and fines. R193-94. The report recommended that 
defendant remain on probation. Rl 95. 
Third report. On May 9,2003, three days before defendant's probation was to expire 
by operation of law, AP&P filed a progress/violation report stating that the end of 
defendant's 36-month probation was approaching and that although he had so far paid 
$34,553.20 toward his fines and restitution, he had not yet paid in full and was, therefore, in 
violation of his probation. R228-31; State's Exs. 1, 2 (reproduced in Addendum B). The 
report, which was supported by an affidavit, recommended revoking probation and requested 
that an order to show cause issue.3 Id. The district court judge approved the order to show 
cause request on May 12, 2003, and the order to show cause was signed and issued by the 
court on May 13, 2003. R229, 232-33. 
Although the original progress/violation report and supporting affidavit bore an 
electronic date stamp of May 9, 2003, someone had handwritten in ink the number 13 over 
the number 9. See R228-31; State's Ex. 1, 2; Addendum B. The probation officer served 
the order to show cause on defendant on May 19,2003. R232-33; R481:22. 
3
 Although the written report recommended revocation of probation and 
commitment to prison, it was clear at the subsequent hearing that AP&P had no interest in 
revoking probation, but only wanted to extend probation for the purpose of ensuring 
defendant's on-going compliance with his restitution payments. R481:36-37. 
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Motion to dismiss 
Defendant moved to dismiss the order to show cause for lack of jurisdiction. R234. 
Defendant argued that his probation expired by operation of law on May 12,2003, and that 
to continue his probation, AP&P had to file its report and serve him before that date. R238-
42. Contending that the progress/violation report had been filed a day late on May 13,2003, 
and that he had not been served until May 19, 2003, defendant argued that the district court 
had lost jurisdiction to revoke or extend his probation. Id. 
Apparently anticipating that his probation would expire, defendant, on the advice of 
counsel, did not make his May and June 2003 restitution payments. R481:30. 
At the June 23, 2003, hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court 
heard the testimony of Robert Egelund, defendant's probation officer. R481:10-23. Agent 
Egelund testified that he met with the judge in this case at about 1:30 p.m. on Friday, May 
9, 2003, to discuss the approaching termination of defendant's probation. R481:15-18. 
Egelund specifically advised the court that defendant's 3 6-month probationary period would 
terminate the following Monday, on May 12. R481:17-18. Egelund and the court decided 
that a progress/violation report, affidavit, and order to show cause would be filed that very 
afternoon. R481:16. 
In accordance with that decision, Agent Egelund returned to the court about two hours 
later with a progress/violation report, supporting affidavit, and order to show cause. 
R481:17-19; State's Exs. 1, 2. Agent Egelund testified that he date-stamped each of the 
documents using the court's electronic date-stamp and then placed the documents in the file 
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box located in the court's reception area. R481:16-20. The electronic date-stamp showed 
that the documents had been filed on Friday, May 9, 2003 at 3:41 p.m. State's Exs. 1, 2. 
Upon returning to his office, Egelund recorded on his computer that he had filed the report 
and supporting documents on May 95 2003. R481:19-20. 
Egelund also date-stamped and filed a copy of each document to be returned to him 
once the court had signed the order to show cause and set a date. R481:19-20. The copies 
of the report and affidavit that were returned to Egelund, like the originals in the court file, 
had the number 13 handwritten in ink over the electronically-stamped number 9. State's Exs. 
1, 2. However, the copy of the order to show cause returned to Egelund still bore the 
unaltered date stamp of May 9, 2003. State's Ex. 1. Agent Egelund testified that he did not 
make the changes on the date stamps, nor did he know who had or why. R481:17-18. 
Trial court's ruling denying motion to dismiss and extending probation 
Relying on Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(11 )(b) (2003), the trial court concluded that the 
filing of a violation report tolled the running of the probation period. R3 88-89. The court 
then found, based on "the credible testimony of Mr. Egelund" and the electronic date-stamp 
appearing on the report and supporting documents, that the progress/violation report had been 
filed on May 9, 2003, three days before expiration of the probation period. R388-90; 
R481:33-34. The court rejected defendant's argument that due process also required him to 
be served within the original probationary period. R391-92. The court reasoned that since 
the running of the probationary period had been tolled by the filing of the violation report, 
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service of the order to show cause ten days later, on May 19, 2003, was still within the 
probationary period. R391-92; R481:34. 
Having found that it had jurisdiction, the trial court extended defendant's probation 
for the remaining seven years of his original ten-year sentence (two consecutive 0-5 year 
terms). R392-93. The trial court could find nothing in the probation statutes that expressly 
limited its ability to extend probation only in 36-month increments, as defendant argued. 
R3 92-93. The court then expressed its concern that defendant would not make his restitution 
payments unless he continued on formal probation: 
The defendant's failure to pay the May and June installments of his restitution 
underscores the fact that the defendant is induced to repay his victims only 
when he is in the shadow of probation and the threat of incarceration is held 
over him. Because the defendant's only incentive to continue making 
restitution payments is to avoid his probation being revoked, the Court invokes 
the full scope of its discretion to extend the defendant's probation for the 
maximum length permissible, the remaining full term of his sentence of 10 
years. 
R393. The trial court then ordered defendant to make up the May and June 2003 restitution 
payments he had missed.4 R481:39. (The trial court's Memorandum Decision is reproduced 
in Addendum C). 
Defendant timely appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
and the order extending his probation. R395. 
4Less than two weeks after the trial court issued its written order, defendant 
convinced AP&P to recommend that his restitution payment be reduced from $1,000 per 
month to $300 per month. R3 99-405. The trial court ordered the reduction, although one 
of the victims subsequently objected. R405-06, 407. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(11 )(b) expressly tolls the running of the probation 
period upon the filing of a violation report. Here, the trial court found that the violation 
report was filed on May 9,2003, three days before defendant's probation expired. Defendant 
has not shown that the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. This Court has expressly 
rejected the argument that a defendant must be served before expiration of the probation 
period when a timely violation report has been filed. See State v. Reedy, 937 P.2d 152, 153 
(Utah App. 1997). The trial court, therefore, had jurisdiction to extend defendant's 
probation. 
Point II: The trial court extended defendant's probation based on his failure to fully 
pay restitution, an express condition of his probation. The trial court was not required to find 
that defendant's violation of his probation was wilful. To the contrary, applicable statutes 
and caselaw contemplate that a trial court be permitted to extend probation so as to allow the 
defendant to complete all the conditions of his probation, even when that failure is not wilful. 
Point III: The State agrees that under Utah's probation statute, a trial court may only 
impose and extend probation terms for felonies in 36-month increments. The case should 
therefore be remanded for the trial court to enter an order extending probation for 36 months. 
However, should this Court determine that formal probation was improperly extended in this 
case, it should remand for the trial court to enter an order of bench probation for the purpose 
of enforcing the restitution order. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FILING OF THE PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT THREE 
DAYS BEFORE DEFENDANT'S PROBATION EXPIRED TOLLED 
THE RUNNING OF THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD; THE TRIAL 
COURT, THEREFORE, HAD JURISDICTION TO EXTEND 
DEFENDANT'S PROBATION5 
Defendant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend his probation 
because the violation report was not filed until May 135 20035 one day after his probation 
expired by law. Br. Aplt. 7-12. He alternatively contends that even if the violation report 
was timely filed, the court lost jurisdiction when he was not served with notice of the 
extension proceedings until 7 days after his probation expired by law. Br. Aplt. 12-21. 
As the trial court correctly recognized, UtahCodeAnn. §77-18-1(11 )(b) (2003) tolls 
the running of the probation period upon the filing of a violation report. The trial court 
found that the violation report was not filed on May 13, 2003, as defendant asserts, but on 
May 9,2003, three days before defendant's probation expired. Defendant has not shown that 
the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. This Court has expressly rejected the 
argument that a defendant must be served before expiration of the probation period when a 
timely violation report has been filed. See State v. Reedy, 937 P.2d 152, 153 (Utah App. 
1997). Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant's probation period was 
tolled before it expired and that the court had jurisdiction to extend probation. 
5This point responds to Points I and II of defendant's brief. See Br. Aplt. 7-21. 
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A. Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(ll)(b), the timely filing of the violation 
report tolled the running of defendant's probationary period, 
A trial court's power "to grant, modify, or revoke probation is purely statutory, and 
although a trial court has discretion in these matters, the court's discretion must be exercised 
within the limits imposed by the legislature." Smith v. Coo*, 803 P.2d 788,791 (Utah 1990). 
See also State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 463 (Utah 1988). Thus, whether a trial court has 
jurisdiction to revoke or extend probation is determined by statute. See id. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(10)(a)(i) provides that "[probation may be terminated at 
any time at the discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 36 months 
probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions." Under this provision, probation for a felony automatically 
terminates at the end of 36 months unless revocation or extension proceedings are initiated 
before probation expires. See Green, 757 P.2d at 464-65 (interpreting 1984 version of § 77-
18-l(10)(a)(i)); State v. Moya, 815 P.2d 1312, 1315-16 (Utah App. 1991) (same). 
Subsection (11 )(b) provides that "[t]he running of the probation period is tolled upon 
the filing of a violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions 
of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(1 l)(b). In other words, if a violation report is filed with the court 
before probation expires by law, the probation period is tolled. See State v. Reedy, 937 P.2d 
152,153 (Utah App. 1997). The question then is whether the violation report here was filed 
before or after defendant's probation would expire by law. 
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As stated, defendant was sentenced to 36 months probation on May 12, 2000. R22-
23. Defendant asserts that his probation "technically terminated by law on May 11,2003 at 
midnight" and that "May 12,2003 was one day beyond thirty-six months." Br, Aplt. 7-8,13. 
Defendant is incorrect. "'When the time period is measured in months or years from a 
certain date, the day from which the time period is to run is excluded and the same calendar 
date of the final month or year is included.'" Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 
369 (Utah 1996) (quoting Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah 1981) and citing Utah 
Code Ann. § 68-3-7 and Utah R. Civ. Pro. 6(a)). See also Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 
111, 114 (Utah App. 1987). Under this rule, AP&P had until May 12,2003 to file a violation 
report. See Wilcox,9\\ P.2d at 369 (this rule "admittedly... allow[s] a plaintiff an extra day 
if we grant that he or she could file a complaint on the day of the event"). 
The trial court found that Agent Egelund filed the violation report with the court on 
May 9,2003. "A trial court's factual findings will not be reversed absent clear error." State 
v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, If 60, 28 P.3d 1278. Accord State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^  17 
n. 2, 1 P.3d 1108. "To demonstrate that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous, the defendant 
'must first marshal all the evidence that supports the trial court's findings. After marshaling 
the supportive evidence, the appellant then must show that, even when viewing the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
trial court's findings.9" Widdison, 2001 UT 60, \ 60 (quoting Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 17 n. 
2) (emphasis in original). 
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Defendant has neither marshaled the evidence nor otherwise demonstrated that the 
trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. Although defendant briefly mentions that Agent 
Egelund testified he personally filed and date-stamped the violation report on May 9, 2003, 
he does not explain why this testimony was insufficient to support the trial court's finding. 
Indeed, defendant ignores the evidence corroborating Agent Egelund's testimony: (1) the 
violation report, affidavit, and order to show cause all bear an electronic date-stamp of May 
9, 2003 at 3:41; (2) although the original date-stamps were altered by hand, the date-stamp 
on the order to show cause returned to Egelund was not altered; (3) Egelund denied making 
the changes himself; and (4) the trial court approved the order to show cause on May 12, 
2003, thereby demonstrating that it was filed before May 13. This evidence not only supports 
Agent Egelund's testimony, but it also supports the trial court's finding that the violation 
report was in fact filed on May 9, 2003, and not on May 13, as contended by defendant. 
Defendant suggests that the trial court's finding was impermissibly based on the 
judge's own memory of events and the judge's belief that a court clerk changed the electronic 
date-stamp to reflect the date she entered the report and order to show cause on the computer 
docket. Br. Aplt. 9-10. Defendant argues that because the judge and law clerk were not 
sworn or cross-examined, these factors were not a proper basis for finding that the violation 
report was filed on May 9. Id. 
The trial court's finding, however, was not based on either thejudge's memory or on 
whether the court clerk changed the date to reflect when the documents were entered on the 
computerized docket. While the judge did say he recalled Agent Egelund coming in to 
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discuss defendant's probation, he explained that he did not have "an independent recollection 
of the date" of that conversation. R481:9. Thus, the judge never suggested that his finding 
was based on his independent memory of events. Indeed, the court's written ruling expressly 
states that the finding is based solely on "the documentary evidence before the Court in light 
of Mr. Egelund's credible testimony."6 R389-90. 
Admittedly, the trial court stated in both its oral and written rulings that it believed the 
a court clerk made the changes to the date stamp to reflect the "apparent date that the 
documents were docketed." R389; R481:26-28. Ultimately, however, that observation was 
irrelevant to the court's finding that the violation report was filed on May 9. As stated, the 
trial court expressly based its finding on the "credible testimony" of Mr. Egelund, in 
conjunction with the documentary evidence. R389-90. It was undisputed below that 
someone had subsequently altered the original electronic date-stamp. Who had done so, and 
why, became irrelevant once the trial court determined that Agent Egelund was telling the 
truth when he testified that he filed the violation report on May 9 and that he was not the one 
who had made the alterations. 
6For the first time on appeal, defendant opines that "once the Judge determined 
during the course of the hearing that he had become a material witness, the Judge had an 
obligation to recuse himself from further proceedings associated therewith." Br. Aplt. 9-
10 & n.2. As explained, the record does not support defendant's assertion that the trial 
court acted as a witness in this case, material or otherwise. In any event, if defendant 
believed that the trial judge was biased, it behooved him to move to recuse the judge 
under rule 29, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. His failure to do so precludes him from 
challenging the trial court's impartiality now. See State v. Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, ffif 
8-9, 37 P.3d 1180 (defendant waived appellate claim that judge was biased where he did 
not file motion under Utah R. Crim. 29 to recuse judge). 
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Defendant finally argues that the date a document is filed with the co urt "is 
determined almost exclusively by the date upon which [c]ourt records show the document 
was filed, and not by extrinsic testimony." Br. Aplt. 11. In support, defendant cites to this 
Court's prior holding that an appellate court is "'bound by the filing date indicated on the 
notice of appeal transmitted to it by the trial court."5 Br. Aplt. 11 (quoting In re K.G., 2002 
UT App 3, 2002 WL 23812, at *1 (Jan. 4, 2002)). Defendant reasons that if this Court is 
bound by a date-stamp, the district court should also be bound by the date-stamp on the 
violation report. Br. Aplt. 11-12. 
The unpublished decision defendant relies on is inapposite. In K.G., the notice of 
appeal bore one date-stamp that showed the notice of appeal was untimely filed. 2002 UT 
App 3. Here, the violation report reflected two dates: (1) an electronic date-stamp showing 
that the report was timely; and (2) a hand-written change suggesting the report was untimely. 
The presence of the two dates raised a factual question regarding when the violation report 
was filed with the court. The trial court was obligated to resolve the factual issue in order 
to determine whether it had jurisdiction. It could only resolve that issue by taking extrinsic 
evidence. 
Indeed, this Court considered extrinsic evidence under similar circumstances. In 
Raiser v. Buirley, 2002 UT App 277, 54 P.3d 650 (per curiam), this Court had dismissed 
Raiser's appeal as untimely, holding that it was "bound by" the date-stamp appearing on the 
notice of appeal. Id. at f^ 3. On a petition for rehearing, Raiser claimed that he had timely 
filed his notice of appeal with a money order for the filing fee, but that the court clerk had 
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returned the notice of appeal because the money order named the wrong payee. Id. at fflf 3-4. 
This Court noted that Raiser's allegations were supported by the original notice of appeal, 
which bore a date-stamp showing that it had been timely filed. Id. at ^ f 4. The original date-
stamp had been crossed out in ink and initialed. Id. The notice of appeal bore a second date-
stamp, which was not crossed out, but which showed an untimely filing date. Id. Under the 
circumstances, this Court accepted the first date-stamp as the correct one, deemed the notice 
of appeal timely filed, and reinstated the appeal.7 Id. at ^ 9. 
In sum, defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court's finding that the report 
was timely filed on May 9 was clearly erroneous. Thus, under the plain language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(1 l)(b), the running of defendant's probation period was tolled by the 
filing of the violation report and the trial court had jurisdiction to extend his probation. 
B, Neither the tolling provisions of Utah Code Ann, § 77-18-1(1 l)(b), nor due 
process requires that a defendant be served before expiration of the original 
probation period. 
Notwithstanding the tolling provision of subsection (ll)(b), defendant argues that 
even if the violation report was timely filed, due process requires that he be served with 
notice of the probation revocation or extension proceedings before probation expires as a 
^Defendant also relies on State v. Palmer, 111 P.2d 521 (Utah App. 1989) to 
support his claim that the trial court should not have accepted extrinsic evidence to 
determine the correct filing date. Br. Aplt. 11. Palmer, however, addressed only whether 
the Court should adopt the prison mailbox rule to make an otherwise untimely notice of 
appeal timely. Palmer, 111 P.2d at 522. That case only stands for the proposition that 
failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction. Id. 
Here, no one disputes that an untimely violation report would have deprived the trial court 
of jurisdiction to extend probation. Rather, the pertinent question here is whether the 
violation report was in fact timely filed. Palmer does not help answer that question. 
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matter of law. Br. Aplt. 12-21. Defendant contends that since he was not served with the 
order to show cause until seven days after his probation was scheduled to expire, the trial 
court lost jurisdiction to extend probation. Br. Aplt. 12-13. Defendant cites several Utah 
cases in support of his argument. 
As shown below, defendant's argument depends on cases that either interpreted earlier 
versions of section 77-18-1 that did not contain subsection (ll)(b)'s express tolling 
provision, or that rested on other subsections not relevant here. Contrary to defendant's 
claim, none of those cases held that due process required notice of probation extension 
proceedings before expiration of probation; rather, they all expressly based their holdings on 
statutory construction. Indeed, the only case to directly address the effect of subsection 11(b) 
expressly rejected defendant's argument. See State v. Reedy, 937 P.2d 152 (Utah 1997) (per 
curiam). 
In Green, 757 P.2d at 463-65, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the 1984 version 
of section 77-18-1 to require that probation proceedings be initiated before expiration of the 
probation period. In so holding, the supreme court rejected the State's contention that the 
then statutory "eighteen-month term [was] 'tolled' when any violation occurs within the 
period and that there is no time limit for initiating a revocation action." Id. at 464. The 
Green court observed that the State's interpretation of the statute would create an "indefinite 
probationary term [that] could theoretically be revoked many years after the original 
imposition and suspension of sentence." Id. This, the court concluded, was contrary to "the 
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plain meaning" of the statute. Id. The 1984 version of section 77-18-1 did not include the 
tolling provision that currently appears in subsection (1 l)(b).8 
In Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 794-95 (Utah 1990), the supreme court interpreted 
the 1981 version of section 77-18-1 to require that a defendant also be served with notice of 
revocation proceedings before expiration or termination of his probation period, so long as 
the defendant was not "actively evading supervision." Although Smith states that its statutory 
interpretation was in accord with due process concerns, it makes clear that its holding rests 
not on due process, but on the construction of the "relevant statutes." Id. at 794-96. Indeed, 
the Smith court recognized that while some states held that filing a violation report was 
sufficient to retain jurisdiction over a probationer, this was matter of statutory construction. 
Id. at 794-95 & n.33. Nothing in the Smith opinion remotely suggests that due process 
requires notice, in addition to filing a report, during the probation period. Moreover, like the 
1984 version addressed in Green, the 1981 provision also lacked express tolling provision 
of current subsection (1 l)(b). 
In State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1067-70 (Utah App. 1995), this Court, in 
interpreting the 1985 version of section 77-18-1, followed Smith and required notice of 
extension, as well as revocation, proceedings before probation expired. Observing that Smith 
"involved the statutory prerequisites to commencement of a probation revocation 
8Section 77-18-1 was amended effective March 29, 1984, to toll the probation 
period when a probationer evaded probation supervision or absented himself from the 
state without permission. See 1984 Utah Laws § 20 (77-18-1(11)). It was also amended 
to exclude time spent in or out of confinement after a violation and while awaiting a 
hearing or decision concerning revocation, unless the defendant was exonerated. Id. 
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proceeding," the Rowlings court recognized that it too "must look to the applicable statutes 
to determine 'which stage in the [extension] proceedings must be reached within the period 
of the probation for the court to retain its authority over probationers beyond the probation 
period.'" Id. at 1068-69 (quoting Smith, 803 P.2d at 794) (emphasis and brackets in 
original). After reviewing the pertinent statutory provisions, this Court concluded that 
jurisdiction to extend probation depended on service before expiration of the probation 
period. Id. Thus, Rowlings, like Green and Smith, held that this requirement was required, 
not by due process, but by statute.9 Again, the 1985 version did not contain subsection 
(1 l)(b)'s express tolling provision. 
Because the express tolling provision in subsection (1 l)(b) was not enacted until 
1989, see 1989 Utah Laws § 226, neither Green, Smith, nor Rowlings addressed whether, 
under its provisions, a defendant would have to be served before expiration of probation if 
a timely violation report had been filed. This Court directly addressed that question in State 
v. Reedy, 937 P.2d 152 (Utah App. 1997). Relying on Green and Smith, Reedy, like 
defendant here, claimed that he was required to be notified of any revocation or extension 
9Quoting Rawlings, defendant argues that "[i]t is well settled that a probationer 
shall be accorded due process at revocation proceedings because revoking probation 
seriously deprives a person of his or her liberty." Br. Aplt. 15. The due process 
discussion in Rawlings, however, related not to whether a defendant must be served 
before his probation expires, but to what notice and process a probationer was due before 
his probation could be extended or revoked. See Rowlings, 893 P.2d at 1066-68. As 
stated, this Court recognized in Rawlings that the prerequisites for continued jurisdiction 
were a matter of statutory construction, not due process. Id. at 1068-69. This Court 
concluded that Rawlings' due process rights were violated because he had only bee 
casually informed about the proceedings two days before the hearing and that this was 
insufficient notice to allow him to prepare to answer the allegations. Id. at 1070-71. 
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proceedings before his probation expired. Id. at 153. Quoting subsection (1 l)(b), this Court 
held that a violation report and an order to show cause issued before expiration of Reedy's 
probation period was sufficient to toll the probation period. Id. at 153. "The plain language 
of the statute does not require service of the notice, order, or warrant within the probation 
period as Reedy suggests." Id. This Court found Reedy's reliance on Green and Smith 
unhelpful because both cases "interpreted] earlier versions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1, 
none of which contained] the pertinent subsection [(1 l)(b)]." Id. at 153. Accordingly, this 
Court affirmed the trial court's revocation of Reedy's probation. Id. 
Defendant's only discussion of Reedy appears in a footnote in which he asserts that 
its decision was based on the fact that defendant had "made service impracticable" by leaving 
the state. Br. Aplt. 21 n.4. A fair reading of Reedy, however, reveals that this observation 
was not necessary to the Court's decision, but was dicta. After holding that the plain 
language of subsection (ll)(b) did not require service before expiration of the probation 
period, this Court pointed out that Reedy's reliance on Green and Smith was unavailing, not 
only because they interpreted earlier statutes, but because defendant had evaded service by 
leaving the jurisdiction. Reedy, 937 P.2d at 153. "[T]hus, even under the Smith analysis," 
this Court concluded, "it would not be necessary to serve him during the probation period." 
Id. In short, this part of the opinion was unnecessary to the Court's ruling and was included 
only to explain that Reedy would fail under either analysis.10 
10In any event, the legislature clearly did not intend to make the tolling provisions 
of current subsection (1 l)(b) dependent on whether the probation had made service 
impracticable. Before the 1989, subsection (1 l)(b) stated: "When any probationer, 
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Despite Reedy"§ clear applicability to this case, defendant contends that this Court's 
subsequent decision in State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1997) compels a different 
result. Br. Aplt. 17-21. In Grate, this Court reversed the revocation of the defendant's 
probation because he had not been served with the order to show cause before his probation 
expired, even though a violation report had been timely filed. Id. at 1164-66. Defendant 
asserts that "[t]he Grate court considered this tolling provision of Utah law [subsection 
(1 l)(b)] and determined that it had no force and effect because of the failure of the State of 
Utah to have served the defendant with the Order to Show Cause until several days after his 
probation was due to terminate." Br. Aplt. 21. 
Grate, however, did not address subsection (1 l)(b). Rather, the Court expressly stated 
that it was "analyzing] this matter under the 1988 version of the statute." Grate, 947 P.2d 
at 1163 n.l. As stated, and as conceded by defendant, subsection (1 l)(b) was not enacted 
until 1989. See 1989 Utah Laws § 226; Br. Aplt. 20. Accordingly, Grate is inapposite.11 
Defendant finally relies on State v. Call, 1999 UT 42, 980 P.2d 201, to support his 
argument that actual notice is required before expiration of the probation period. Br. Aplt. 
without authority from the court of the Department of Corrections, absents himself form 
the state, or avoids or evades probation supervision, the period of absence, avoidance, or 
evasion tolls the probation period." See 1989 Utah Laws § 226. The 1989 amendment 
replaced the foregoing with the current language tolling probation merely upon the filing 
of a violation report. Id. If the legislature had intended defendant's lack of evasion to be 
a prerequisite for tolling, it would have left that language in the statute. 
1
 defendant's description of Grate suggests that its decision was founded on due 
process. See Br. Aplt. 17-21. Even a cursory reading of Grate reveals that it, like Green, 
Smith, Rawlings, and Reedy, is grounded in statutory construction. 
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16-17. Like the other cases on which defendant relies, Call does not address subsection 
(1 l)(b) and whether, under its tolling provision, a defendant must be notified of extension 
proceedings before his probation terminates. 
The defendant in Call was ordered, as a condition of his probation, to complete a sex 
offender treatment program. Call, 1999 UT 42, TJ 3. Call entered such a program, but could 
not complete it before his probation would expire in early April 1995. Id. at fflf 2-3. On 
March 20,1995, Call, at the request of his probation officer, executed a "Waiver of Personal 
Appearance Before the Court," in which he waived the right to a hearing and agreed to 
extend his probation one more year so that he could complete his treatment program. Id. at 
f 3. However, AP&P did not file the signed waiver and a progress/violation report until 
April 5, 1995, which was arguably after his probation had expired.12 Id. at \ 3. The trial 
court granted the extension the same day. Id. 
Call argued on appeal that "felony probation terminates by [operation of] law after 36 
months unless the probation period is tolled or the trial court acts to extend probation during 
the probation period." Id. at f 8. Citing to subsection (ll)(b), Call argued that because 
"AP&P failed to file the progress/violation report or otherwise initiate the extension 
proceedings prior to [the expiration date], his probation was not tolled, but terminated as a 
matter of law." Id. 
12The State and the defense disputed whether Call's probation expired on April 3 
or April 8, 1992. Id. at ffif 2 & n.l. Ultimately, the supreme court's disposition of the 
case did not require it to resolve that dispute. 
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The Call court, however, did not address whether subsection (1 l)(b) applied in that 
case. Instead, it decided the case under section 77-18-l(12)(a)(i), which provides that 
probation may not be modified or extended '" except upon waiver of a hearing by the 
probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the 
conditions of probation.'"/J. atf 11 (quoting § 77-18-1(12)(a)(i)) (emphasis in opinion). 
The supreme court essentially held that under this provision, a trial court had jurisdiction to 
extend probation when a defendant signs a waiver of hearing before expiration of the 
probation period. Call, 1999 UT 42, ffif 9-12. 
Defendant nevertheless contends that Call held that due process requires notice prior 
to expiration of probation. Br. Aplt. 16-17. He gleans this argument from the fact that the 
Call court cited to both Green and Smith, and stated, "These cases instruct that if it is the 
intent of the State to extend the probationary period beyond its original term, the State must 
take definitive action to extend the term before the expiration date, and the probationer must 
be given notice of that intent." Id. at 11. Contrary to defendant's argument, that statement 
does not suggest that due process requires notice before expiration of the probation period. 
As stated, the holdings in both Green and Smith were based on the interpretation of the 
statutes in effect at that time. Neither case rested on due process concerns. More important, 
Call does not suggest, either expressly or implicitly, that its decision is grounded on due 
process. 
At most, the foregoing statement is dicta because it was not necessary to the court's 
decision. In any event, Call simply does not address whether prior service is necessary when 
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the probation period is tolled under subsection (ll)(b) by the filing of a timely violation 
report. Rather, as explained, it stands only for the proposition that a trial court has 
jurisdiction to extend probation when a defendant signs a waiver of hearing before expiration 
of the probation period, even though the violation report is subsequently untimely filed. Call, 
1999 UT 42, ffif 9-12. 
In sum, as this Court held in Reedy, the timely filing of a violation report tolls the 
running of the probation period under subsection (1 l)(b). Nothing in the plain language of 
subsection (1 l)(b) requires that notice of the proceedings be given to defendant before his 
probation was originally set to expire. Because the violation report was timely filed in this 
case, defendant's probation period was tolled and the trial court had jurisdiction to extend 
his probation. 
POINT II 
A COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO EXTEND PROBATION UPON A 
FINDING THAT THE PROBATIONER HAS NOT COMPLETED THE 
TERMS OF HIS PROBATION, INCLUDING A FAILURE TO FULLY 
PAY COURT-ORDERED RESTITUTION13 
Defendant argues that the trial court could not extend his probation without first 
finding that he had willfully violated his probation. Br. Aplt. 22-23. Defendant contends 
that because the trial court made no such finding here, it had no basis for extending his 
probation. 
13This point responds to Point III of defendant's brief. Br. Aplt. 22-23. 
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Defendant is correct that "[probation may not be modified or extended except upon 
waiver of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(a)(i). 
However, "[u]pon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court 
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term 
commence anew." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii). 
In this case, the violation report alleged that defendant had violated his probation by 
not fully paying restitution, a condition of his probation. R232-33. Defendant does not now, 
nor did he below, dispute that he has not fully paid restitution. R232-33. Indeed, none of the 
facts regarding defendant's payment of restitution were disputed by the parties. Everyone 
agreed that defendant had made regular monthly payments of $ 1080.00 toward his fines and 
restitution. See R229 . They also agreed that defendant had paid a total of $34,553.20, an 
amount far short of the $355,504.39 he had been ordered to pay. R229. Finally, defendant 
admitted that, on the advice of counsel, he had not made his May and June 2003 payments. 
R481:30. 
Although, the trial court did not expressly find that defendant had not fully paid his 
restitution, the court's oral and written rulings made clear that the basis for extending 
defendant's probation was because he had not fully paid restitution and the court had no 
confidence that he would unless "the threat of incarceration is held over him." R393. See 
also R481:30 (Court: defendant "hasn't paid a nickel on his restitution since he thought 
probation was over. That gives us a pretty good indication as to why I wanted to continue 
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this, doesn't it?"); R481:37,39. Thus, contrary to defendant's argument, the court implicitly 
found that he had violated his probation because he had not completed one of the conditions 
of his probation: payment of restitution to his victims. See State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App 
269, 987 P.2d 1284 (although written findings by court were absent from record, oral 
findings were sufficiently clear so as to allow appellate court to determine basis of trial 
court's decision); see also State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262,271 (Utah 1998) (noting that while 
trial court had not made express finding that jury was not prejudiced, it had implicitly made 
that finding). 
The real question, then, is whether a finding that a defendant has not fully paid his 
restitution, even though that failure is not willful, constitutes a "violation" for the purpose 
of extending probation. Relying on State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1990), 
defendant argues that his probation could be extended only if his failure to pay full restitution 
was "wilful." Br. Aplt. 23. Defendant's reliance on Hodges is misplaced. The defendant 
in Hodges had his probation revoked because he was not making sufficient progress in his 
sex offender treatment program. Hodges, 798 P.2d at 271-73. This Court held that "as a 
general rule, in order to revoke probation for the violation of a condition of probation not 
involving the payment of money, the violation must be willful or, if not willful, must 
presently threaten the safety of society." Id. at 277 (emphasis added). In reaching that 
holding, this Court relied on Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660,662 (1983), which held that 
"in order to revoke probation for failure to make money payments, the sentencing court must 
either find that probationer was at fault or that alternatives other than imprisonment are 
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inadequate to meet the state's interests in punishment and deterrence." Hodges, 798 P.2d 
at 276 (emphasis added). 
Both Hodges and Bear den stand for the proposition that a defendant's probation may 
not be revoked and a defendant incarcerated unless failure to pay restitution is wilful. 
Neither case suggests that a non-wilful failure to pay restitution cannot be dealt with by 
extending probation to give the defendant more time to pay restitution. To the contrary, both 
cases seem to contemplate that extension of probation is an appropriate remedy to deal with 
a non-wilful failure to fully comply with the terms of probation. See Bear den, 461 U.S. at 
668-69 ("if the probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and 
yet cannot do so through not fault of his own, it is fundamentally unfair to revoke probation 
automatically without considering whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the 
defendant are available") (emphasis added); Hodges, 798 P.2d at 276 (same). 
Under defendant's argument, a trial court could never extend probation, even though 
the defendant has not fully complied with the conditions of his probation. This would 
subvert the rehabilitative purposes of granting probation. See State v. Allendinger, 565 P.2d 
1119, 1121 (Utah 1977) (holding that obvious intent of probation statute is "to permit the 
court to rehabilitate an erring criminal and to make a useful citizen out of him"). For 
example, a defendant, ordered to complete sex offender treatment as a condition of probation, 
may not be able to complete the program within the probation period through no fault of his 
own. Under defendant's analysis, this would not be a "violation" of probation and the trial 
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court would therefore lack authority to extend probation to ensure that the defendant is fully 
rehabilitated before being released unfettered into society. 
Moreover, defendant's reasoning was rejected by Hodges, which expressly recognized 
that a showing of "fault is not necessary in every instance of probation revocation . . . " Id. 
at 276. See also Bear den, 461 U.S. at 668 n.9 (noting that "it may indeed be reckless" to 
continue probation for someone unable to control a problem, thereby posing a threat to the 
safety or welfare of society). If fault is not always required to revoke probation, it certainly 
cannot and should not be a prerequisite to extend probation. 
That "violation" for purposes of extending probation does not necessarily mean 
"wilful" is also supported by this Court's decision in State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1207 
(Utah App. 1992). There, this Court held that under the applicable probation and restitution 
statutes, the State "can enforce restitution as both a condition of probation pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8) [1992 version], and as a separate and independent component of 
the court's judgement and the defendant's original sentence . . . ." Id. at 1207 (emphasis 
added). This suggests that the trial court has the discretion to continue formal probation 
solely for the purpose of ensuring complete payment of restitution as a term of probation, but 
that if probation has not been ordered, or has been terminated, the court nevertheless has 
independent authority to collect restitution. See also State v. Nones, 2000 UT App 211, f^ 6, 
11 P.3d 709 ("Because Nones's probation was not extended according to the terms for 
extending probation found in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8), (10) (Supp. 1992), independent 
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jurisdiction over enforcement of restitution orders must exist to enable use to affirm the trial 
court's decision"). Id. at ^ 6. 
In sum, defendant's non-wilful failure to folly pay restitution constituted a violation 
for purposes of extending his probation under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(e)(ii).14 
Because that fact was not disputed below, the trial court had authority to extend defendant's 
probation. 
POINT III 
UTAH'S PROBATION STATUTE SETS A PRESUMPTIVE 
PROBATION TIME LIMIT OF 36 MONTHS; THEREFORE, THE 
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER SHOULD BE AMENDED TO EXTEND 
DEFENDANT'S PROBATION FOR 36 MONTHS 
Defendant finally argues that the trial court exceeded its authority in extending his 
probation beyond 36 months to "the remaining term of the court's original sentence," (ten 
years minus the three years already served on probation). Br. Aplt. 24. The State agrees that 
a fair reading of the relevant probation statutes supports this argument and that the case 
should be remanded for the trial court to amend the order to extend defendant's probation for 
36 months. 
As stated, section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) provides, "Probation may be terminated at any 
time at the discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 36 months 
14Holding that a trial court could not extend probation without a finding of a 
wilfulness would substantially affect current practice in the trial courts, where it is not 
uncommon to extend probation so as to allow a defendant to complete the conditions of 
his or her probation. See, e.g., State v. Call, 1999 UT 42, \ 5, 980 P.2d 201; State v. 
Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1064 (Utah App. 1995). 
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probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases . . . ." This Court has called the time 
frame in this provision a "maximum formal probation" period. See State v. Robinson, 860 
P.2d 979, 982 (Utah App. 1993). 
The question is whether in extending probation beyond the initial period, the trial 
court can impose more than an additional 36 months. As the trial court correctly recognized, 
the statutes do not expressly prohibit imposing a lengthier probation period. R392. 
However, neither do they expressly authorize it. Moreover, section 77-18-1(12)(e)(i) 
provides that upon finding that a defendant has violated the conditions of his probation "the 
court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term 
commence anew." This list of potential remedies suggests that the trial court may not impose 
a greater period of probation than 36 months, but can only restart the original term. This 
indicates that the legislature intended that probation be extended only increments of the 
presumptive statutory probation term. However, nothing in the statues prohibit the trial court 
from continuing probation in 36-month increments until defendant has fully paid his 
restitution. To the contrary, the statutes appear to contemplate that this can be done. See 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(12)(e) (providing that court may order that the "entire probation 
term commence anew). 
The State therefore agrees that this matter should be remanded for the trial court to 
amend its order to extend probation 36 months. 
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It is important to note that even if this Court were to rule that the trial court improperly 
extended defendant's formal probation, the trial court may retain bench probation over 
defendant until he fully pays his restitution. Section 77-18-1(1 )(a)(ii)(A) provides, "If, upon 
expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains 
an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court 
may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the 
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable." Defendant concedes 
that this provision permits the trial court to continue bench probation no matter how long it 
takes for him to pay restitution. Br. Aplt. 25-26 n.7. 
The trial court correctly found that this provision did not apply, by its plain language, 
because defendant's probation was extended before it had expired or terminated. R391. 
However, should this Court determine that formal probation was improperly extended in this 
case, it should nevertheless remand for the court to place defendant on bench probation as 
it was the trial court's clear intent to exercise jurisdiction over defendant as long as it could 
to ensure full payment of restitution.15 
15It should also be noted that there appears to be little practical difference between 
continuing defendant on formal probation or placing him on bench probation for the 
purpose of enforcing restitution. Either way, if defendant wilfully fails to pay his 
restitution, the trial court can incarcerate him. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.1(4) 
(2003) (providing that if defendant fails to make good faith effort" to make payments, the 
court may find defendant in contempt and "order the defendant committed until the 
criminal judgment account receivable, or a specified part of it, is paid"). Also, under both 
formal and bench probation, the trial court may order AP&P to continue to collect 
restitution from defendant at the payment schedule set by the court and to notify the court 
should defendant default on any of his payments. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(9)(b) 
(Department of Corrections to collect restitution during "probation period in cases for 
31 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the trial 
court's extension of defendant's probation and to remand for the trial court to amend its order 
to limit the extension to the statutory 36 months. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /S# day of Ma^A 2004. 
MARX L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
:AURA B. DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
which court orders supervised probation and any extension of that period by the 
department in accordance with Subsection (10)"). See, e.g, State v. Nones, 2000 UT App 
211,^3 (trial court retained bench probation for collection of restitution, but ordered 
AP&P to monitor collection of remaining restitution). 
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prepaid, two accurate copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to: 
Larry R. Keller 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
PO BOX 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (2003) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.1 (2003) 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Termination, revoca-
tion, modification, or extension — Hearings — 
Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend 
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The 
court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;: 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court. 
—,>«. j-*x \jkja.v±\jxj.K2i. a ULXJ.VJ.OX IMJLC; D U J J C I V101UI1 UI LIJLt3 
department is with the department. / 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the 
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may 
require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail 
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation 
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, in-
cluding the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-
20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
ation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the 
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the 
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as 
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under 
Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection (10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may he terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions, 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period 
under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance 
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the 
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defen-
dant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the 
payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record 
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already 
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the 
account to the Office of State Debt Collection, 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, 
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to 
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt 
of court, 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of 
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in 
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will 
occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and 
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated, 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations* 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses s abject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact, 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah 
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the 
court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving pri-
ority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
76-3-201.1. Collection of criminal judgment accounts re-
ceivable. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Criminal judgment accounts receivable" means any amount due the 
state arising from a criminal judgment for which payment has not been 
received by the state agency that is servicing the debt. 
(b) "Accounts receivable" includes unpaid fees, overpayments, fines, 
forfeitures, surcharges, costs, interest, penalties, restitution to victims, 
third party claims, claims, reimbursement of a reward, and damages. 
(2) (a) A criminal judgment account receivable ordered by the court as a 
result of prosecution for a criminal offense may be collected by any means 
authorized by law for the collection of a civil judgment. 
(b) (i) The court may permit a defendant to pay a criminal judgment 
account receivable in installments. 
(ii) In the district court, if the criminal judgment account receiv-
able is paid in installments, the total amount due shall include all 
fines, surcharges, postjudgment interest, and fees. 
(c) Upon default in the payment of a criminal judgment account 
receivable or upon default in the payment of any installment of that 
receivable, the criminal judgment account receivable may be collected as 
provided in this section or Subsection 77-18-1(9) or (10), and by any means 
authorized by law for the collection of a civil judgment. 
(3) When a defendant defaults in the payment of a criminal judgment 
account receivable or any installment of that receivable, the court, on motion 
of the prosecution, victim, or upon its own motion may: 
(a) order the defendant to appear and show cause why the default 
should not be treated as contempt of court; or 
(b) issue a warrant of arrest. 
(4) (a) Unless the defendant shows that the default was not attributable to 
an intentional refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure to make 
a good faith effort to make the payment, the court may find that the 
default constitutes contempt. 
(b) Upon a finding of contempt, the court may order the defendant 
committed until the criminal judgment account receivable, or a specified 
part of it, is paid. 
(5) If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the default is not 
contempt, the court may enter an order for any of the following or any 
combination of the following: 
(a) require the defendant to pay the criminal judgment account receiv-
able or a specified part of it by a date certain; 
(b) restructure the payment schedule; 
(c) restructure the installment amount; 
(d) except as provided in Section 77-18-8, execute the original sentence 
of imprisonment; 
(e) start the period of probation anew; 
(f) except as limited by Subsection (6), convert the criminal judgment 
account receivable or any part of it to community service; 
(g) except as limited by Subsection (6), reduce or revoke the unpaid 
amount of the criminal judgment account receivable; or 
(h) in the district court, record the unpaid balance of the criminal 
judgment account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the respon-
sibility for collecting the judgment to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(6) In issuing an order under this section, the court may not modify the 
amount of the judgment of complete restitution. 
(7) Whether or not a default constitutes contempt, the court may add to the 
amount owed the fees established under Subsection 63A-8-201(4)(g) and 
postjudgment interest. 
(8) (a) (i) If a criminal judgment account receivable is past due in a case 
supervised by the Department of Corrections, the judge shall deter-
mine whether or not to record the unpaid balance of the account 
receivable as a civil judgment. 
(ii) If the judge records the unpaid balance of the account receiv-
able as a civil judgment, the judge shall transfer the responsibility for 
collecting the judgment to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(b) If a criminal judgment account receivable in a case not supervised 
by the Department of Corrections is past due, the district court may, 
without a motion or hearing, record the unpaid balance of the criminal 
judgment account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the respon-
sibility for collecting the account receivable to the Office of State Debt 
Collection. 
(c) If a criminal judgment account receivable in a case not supervised by 
the Department of Corrections is more than 90 days past due, the district 
court shall, without a motion or hearing, record the unpaid balance of the 
criminal judgment account receivable as a civil judgment and transfer the 
responsibility for collecting the criminal judgment account receivable to 
the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(9) (a) When a fine, forfeiture, surcharge, cost permitted by statute, fee, or 
an order of restitution is imposed on a corporation or unincorporated 
association, the person authorized to make disbursement from the assets 
of the corporation or association shall pay the obligation from those assets. 
(b) Failure to pay the obligation may be held to be contempt under 
Subsection (3), 
(10) The prosecuting attorney may collect restitution in behalf of a victim. 
ADDENDUM B 
State's Exhibits 1 and 2 
TO: 3RD DISTRICT-
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah 
ATTN: Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
FROM: Salt Lake AP&P 
STATE OF
 OTJIEF]I?¥?;TTO 
ADULT PROBATION ANB^«©08^HjW>4-fiMT3: 5f T T 
pR O T E C T E DKJii^iyj|rT4ii 
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT^ 
'HKPUTY CLERK ' 
REGARDING: ORR, David Jay 
CASE NO.: 001902772 
OFFENSE: Real Estate Broker/Agent With Out 
License, 3rd Degree Felony; 
Securities Fraud, 3rd Degree Felony 
DATE: 05/09/2003 
PROBATION DATE: 05/12/2000 
LEGISLATIVE DATE: 05/11/2003 
DEFENSE ATTY: Lairy R. Keller 
OFFENDERS 139242 
ADDRESS: 5449 W SUNTREE (3350 S.) AVE, 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84120 
EMPLOYMENT: Mca-Mark/Consult/Agent, 
Y2 Marketing, 
1801 North Hampton #420, 
Desoto TX 75115 
COMMENTS: 
On 05/12/2000, the defendant was placed on probation with the following conditions: 
1. Commit no further violations and/or crimes. 
2. Obtain and maintain lawful, verifiable, full-time employment. 
3. Submit truthful and detailed financial income reports to AP&P as directed. 
4. Pay fine in the amount of $1850.00, payable to the Court. 
5. That the defendant avoid all activities involving investments or other financial transactions using assets 
belonging to persons outside of his immediate family or requiring professional licensing. 
6. Serve 180 days in the Salt Lake County Jail, commencing on 05/12/00, with no credit for time served. 
7. Have no contact with victims. 
8. Pay restitution, in an amount to be determined, at a rate of $1000 per month or 25% of monthly income. 
PROBATION UPDATE: The defendant has been indicted federally for Conspiracy To Commit Mail 
Fraud, Wire Freud and Conspiracy To Defraud The United States, 18 U.S.C. 371. There is four other co-
defendants indicted with the defendant. According to the indictment, the latest date the defendant is 
charged is in February 2000. The defendant was convicted of his probation case in March 2000 and placed 
on probation in May 2000, thus, the new federal charge occurred before the defendant's current Third 
District probation case. 
RE; ORR, David Jay - 2 -
FINES/FEES: The defendant has paid $600 of the $1,850 court fine. He is presently overdue $150 on 
supervision fees. The Department Of Corrections accounting department has not correctly distributed the 
money received by the defendant. He has paid $34,553.20 on this case for restitution and fines. 
RESTITUTION: The defendant has made consistent monthly payments of $1,000 towards restitution. 
After two Restitution Hearings, Dr. Tom Million is to be paid $255,504. Additionally, Kurt Ostler is owed 
$30,000, Jeff Ostler $30,000 and Craig Grenier $50,000. 
SUMMARY: The defendant has not been found in any violation of his probation to date with the 
exception of paying in full the restitution amount. His 36-month probation period is approaching. He has 
pending federal charges. 
'SSUED 
IN THE 3RD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY COURT OF I M L A & E R & B W ' 
FN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH " ^ fpiS^l. DISTRICT 
_
 VL>
 >.*hE COUNTY 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
VS 
ORR, David Jay 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
COURT CASE NO: 001902772 
JUDGE: Timothy R. Hanson 
DEF ATTY: Larry R. Keller 
UPON A READING of the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause, the Court finds 
probable cause to believe that the defendant in this matter has violated the terms and conditions 
of his/her probation as set forth in the Affidavit, and that revocation or modification of 
defendant's probation is justified. 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant appear before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
Judge of the above-entitled Court, at the Judge's courtroom in SALT LAKE, Utah, on the OP 
day of lyhur/" lO^jst the hour of^ff___, then and there to show cause why probation 
of said defendant should not be revoked or modified by the Court based upon the allegations 
contained in the Affidavit on file with the Court. 
^Cg/vg D 
MAY / 
£ourt S§iv[ce IM 
RE: ORR, David Jay 
The defendant has a right to be represented by counsel at the above-described hearing and 
to have appointed to represent the defendant if the defendant is indigent. The defendant also has 
a right to present evidence as provided in the Utadh Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED THIS / 3 dayo/ /7j (Lt^—^ i(\0^> 
'Timothy R. Hanson; 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that this Order to Show Cause and Affidavit in support thereof, was 
personally served upon the defendant at , by showing the 
original and informing the defendant of its contents, and delivering a copy on the day of 
, 20 ; additional copies were delivered to __ 
the defendant, on the day of , 20 . 
counsel for 
ROBERT EGELUND, PROBATION OFFICER 
^flp 
nuo 
DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
VS 
ORR, David Jay 
Plaintiff, 
JKJ j / r dbAY-W w 
^TE OF UTAH _ _ ,T _. T r - r - r 
I£PUTY CLERK 
:AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
:ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
:COURTCASENO: 001902772 
Defendant, :JUDGE: Timothy R. Hanson 
:DEF ATTY: Larry R. Keller 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
):ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ): 
ROBERT EGELUND, being duly sworn upon an oath deposes and says that: He is a 
Probation Officer for the Utah State Department of Corrections; that on the 23rd day of March, 
2000, the above-named defendant was adjudged guilty of the crime of Real Estate Broker/Agent 
With Out License, 3rd Degree Felony; Securities Fraud, 3rd Degree Felony, in the above-entitled 
Court and on the 12th day of May, 2000, was sentenced to serve a term of 0-5 years in the Utah 
State Prison; that the execution of the imposed sentence was stayed and the defendant was placed 
on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections; that the above-entitled 
defendant did violate the terms and conditions of the defendant's probation as follows, to-wit: 
RE: ORR, David Jay 
-2-
1. By having failed to pay restitution in full, as ordered, in violation of a special condition of the 
Probation Agreement. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an Order from the Court issue directing and 
requiring the above-named defendant to be and appear before said Court to show cause, if any 
he/she has, why the aforesaid period of probation should not be revoked, and why said defendant 
should not be forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison. 
ROBERT EGELIMD, PROBATION OFFICER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
LINDA U.OOUDBEAU 
WV
 February 2,2006 
NOTARYPUB 
Residing: J 
Commission expires: 
zk<&^-^ 
Utah 
£&?£> 
m THE 3RD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
VS 
ORR, David Jay 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
COURT CASE NO: 001902772 
JUDGE: Timothy R. Hanson 
DEFATTY: Larry R. Keller 
UPON A READING of the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause, the Court finds 
probable cause to believe that the defendant in this matter has violated the terms and conditions 
of his/her probation as set forth in the Affidavit, and that revocation or modification of 
defendant's probation is justified. 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant appear before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
Judge of the above-entitled Court, at the Judge's courtroom in SALT LAKE, Utah, on the 
day of viACUy} , 20^?at the hour of ^W^^^sa and there to show cause why probation 
of said defendant should not be revoked or modified by the Court based upon the allegations 
contained in the Affidavit on file with the Court. 
RE: ORR, David Jay 
The defendant has a right to be represented by counsel at the above-described hearing and 
to have appointed to represent the defendant if the defendant is indigent. The defendant also has 
a right to present evidence as provided in the Utaji Rules of Civil Procedure, 
DATED THIS & . day o f fl[(to\ 2 0 ^ > 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that this Order to Show Cause and Affidavit in support thereof, was 
personally served upon the defendant at , by showing the 
original and informing the defendant of its contents, and delivering a copy on the day of 
, 20 ; additional copies were delivered to 
the defendant, on the day of , 20_ 
counsel for 
ROBERT EGELUND, PROBATION OFFICER 
ADDENDUM C 
Trial Court's Memorandum Decision 
Third Judicial District-
JUL - 2 2003 
INiTHEf DISTRICT^ COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
INf AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH~ 
: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
i CASE NO. 001902772 
This matter came before the Court for hearina on 
3, m connection with the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Order to 
r Lack of Jurisdiction. The State elicited testimony 
?lund, the defendant's AP&P officer. The Cmut 
,eceivea into evidence two exhibits, consisting of Mr. Egelund's 
copies of the Progress/Violation Report and the Affidavit in 
Support of the Order to Show Cause (both of win^n were oia^riju^ 
filed with the Court). 
following Mr .* Egelundfs testimony and oral arqument I n 
jrosecution and counsel for the defendant, tne Court ruled from the 
Dench that the defendant's Motion to Dismiss waif denied and tHa^ he 
^as to make up ETiesMSjF and June restitution payments. The; Cdur 
whether the defendant!s 
extended to the limit or term of the oriainal 
-ut also indicated to counsel tnat a more tinorougn 
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cession of the Court's legal basis for denying the Motion to 
Dismiss would be included in the Memorandum Decision that the Court 
would issue, Having now again reviewed the defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss (the State did not file a response) and having considered 
counsel's arguments and Mr. EgeLund's testimony, the Court rules as 
stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In his Motion to Dismiss, the defendant contends that this 
Court lacks the jurisdiction to initiate probation extension 
proceedings against him because these proceedings were not 
initiated until after probation had already terminated by operation 
of law. The defendant's argument is based on an erroneous 
presumption that his probation terminated on May 12, 2 003, and that 
the proceedings were not formally commenced until May 13, 2 0 03, 
when he considers the Progess/Violation Report to have been filed. 
The legal analysis cf whether this Court has Die jurisdiction 
to extend the defendant's probation begins with an analysis of when 
the extension proceedings were initiated in this case and when the 
defendant's probation would have terminated. As an aside, the 
Court notes that the defendant takes issue with whether this Court 
is even permitted to consider an extension of his probation given 
that the filing of a Progress/Violation Report implies a potential 
revocation proceeding and possible incarceration. According to the 
?AGE 3 
defendant; such ^a Report is an inappropriate vehicles-for seeking an 
extension of his- probation, even if ±\ been timely? filed", 
7he Court concludes that, the styling of. the report is 
•: given that .the Court has a wide latitude and 
ieterminina whether'probation should be r •'- ' 
ibility of extending the 
Court and not AP&P that f-
(
:o snyie the repcru '—^ .^U files; with 
tion of 
propriate remedy. In this case, the Court 
defendant o probation, as opposed to revoking it ogetJtieS 
e, the Court will refer to these proceedings a: 'bEa^ iori 
roceediria. Having addressed the defendant's „irgamenf- on 
cms point, tnak.C6urt proceeds-to analyze the timing of the £i!Eing3 
that initiated tffifl^probation extension proceeding. 
"nder iT"^ h ^ode Annotated §77-13 -1 t 1) !b= , "[tjiie running of 
the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a vio^SKojg 
report with the court alleqiinq a vio"!?,tior * "errcs and 
conditions of probation or upon m e issuance of an order to show* 
:ause or warrant by the court." The first issue.therefore becomes" 
when the'Procrress/Violation Report was filed and /;:-••:-':.. L 
running ot the defendant's probation period under §77-13-
l(ll)(b). 
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The filing date for the Progress/Violation Report "was 
established by the credible testimony of Mr. Egelund. Mr. Egelund 
testified that he met with the undersigned on May 9, 20C3, and 
pursuant to that meeting, he returned to the Court on the same date 
lor une purpose of filing the Pi ogress/Violation Report and the 
Affidavit in Support of: Orel 2 r: to Show Cause. Mr. Egelund 
specifically testified that on May 9, 2003, he biought copies cf 
these documents to the Court, date-stamped them and le:t them ^n 
the intake basket for the Court's clerk. In support of this 
testimony, Mr. Egelund ofEered his copies of the Progress/Violation 
Report and the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause (marked 
Exhibits 1 and 2) . A review of these documents indicates hand-
Antten changes to the Ma/ 9, 1 D0 3>, date-stamp to reflect a date of 
May 13, 2003. However, the cop/ of Order to Show Cause attached to 
the Progress/Violation Report (Exhibit 1) his no such hand-written 
change. This copy of the Orde - to Show Cause clearly shews a date-
stamp of May 9, 2C03. Taking together the documentary evidence 
before the Court ir light of Mi. Eilgelund's credible testimony, the 
Court finds that the Progress/Violation Report and the Affidavit 
were filed on May 9, 2 0 03, but that for reasons that the Court need 
not delve into, hand-written changes were made to the date-stamp to 
reflect an apparent date that the documents were docketed. 
However, the pivotal date und<E r §77-18-1(11) (b) is not the date of 
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docketing, but rather the date of filing. In this case, this date 
is easily determined by Mr. Egelund's testimony that he delivered 
these documents to the Court for filing on May 9, 2 0 03, and that he 
date-stamped the documents himself with the date of May 9, 2003. 
An alternative date for tolling the probationary period is the 
issuance of an order to show cause. The documents in this case 
reflect that the Court approved and authorized issuance or r.ne 
jraer co bnow Cause on May 12, 2003. Having established the dates 
of May 9, 2003, or May 12, 2003, as potential dates for tolling the 
defendant's probationary period, the Court now proceeds to evaluate 
whether these dates occurred prior to the legislative termination 
of the defendant's probation.1 
The defendant was placed on probation by this Court on May 
12, 2000. The Court reasons that the first day of probation would 
have concluded 24 hours after the sentence was imposed or at the 
cicse of business on the following day, May 13, 2000. Therefore, 
1
 During oral argument, the State alluded to a statement made 
£>y the Court at a February 16, 2 0 01, hearing, as providing the 
basis for concluding that the Court extended the defendant's 
probation at that time. Although the Court indicated at that 
hearing that the defendant's probation would not terminate 
pending restitution being satisfied, this statement was not 
intended as a suggestion that probation was extended or that a 
violation in probation had occurred. For these reasons, the 
Court does not rely on the February 16, 2001, date in its 
analysis. 
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the defendant's probation was set to expire by operation of law en 
May 13, 2 0 03, the termination date of the defendant's 36-month 
probationary period. Accordingly, Mr. Egelund's filing of the 
Progress/Violation Report on May 9, 2 003, and this Court's 
authorization to issue the Order to Show Cause on May 12, 200 3, 
both occurred prior to the legislative termination of the 
defendant's probation. The defendant's probation period was 
therefore tolled either on May 9, 2003, or at the latest, May 12, 
2003 . 
The tolling of the defendant's probation period prior to its 
legislative termination sounds a death knell to two of the 
defendant's principal arguments.. First, the defendant argues that 
under §77-18-10 (a) (ii) (A), this. Court can retain jurisdiction over 
him only under the form of a bench probation. However, this 
provision never comes into plav because the defendant's probation 
did not expire or terminate under §77-18-10 (a) (i) , but was instead 
tolled under §77-18-1(11; (b). 
Second, the defendant: argues that the due process concerns of 
State v. Call, 980 P.2d 201 (Utah. 1999), have been violated in this 
case because he was not notified of the State's intent to extend 
his probation before the expiiation of his probation period. Once 
again, the holding in Call is not applicable to these facts because 
the defendant's probation did not expire, it was tolled. 
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Therefore, the service upon the defendant of the Order to Show 
Cause on May 19, 2003, was within the probationary period ana was 
therefore appropriate under due" process considerations. 
Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that it has 
jurisdiction to extend the defendant's probation because the 
probation extension proceedings were initiated prior to the 
legislative termination of the probation period and served LO UOII 
tne probation period under §77-18-1(11) (b) . The defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss is therefore denied. 
Having concluded that the Court has jurisdiction to extend the 
ietendant's probation period, the Court next considers the issue of 
whether the Court can extend the defendant's probation in 36-month 
intervals or for the full duration of his remaining 10-year 
sentence (two terms not to exceed 5 years, to run consecutivelv). 
^he Court's own legal research has not yielded a case or statute 
addressing this precise issue. However, distilling the general law 
on the trial court's discretion in matters of sentencing and 
probation to its essence provides that while the Court has a large 
measure of flexibility, it must be exercised "within legislatively! 
established limits." State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988) „ 
Further, the Court can find no express limitation on the 
permissible length of probation; only that the probation, together 
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with any extensions, not exceed the legislatively established 
sentencing guidelines. 
Applying these concepts to this case, the Court concludes that 
it has the discretion to extend the defendant's probation up to the 
remaining term of the Court's original sentence (equating to 10 
years) . The defendant's failure to pay the May and June 
installments of his restitution underscores the fact that the 
defendant is induced to repay his victims only when he is in the 
shadow of probation and the threat of incarceration is held over 
him. Because the defendant's only incentive to continue making 
restitution payments is to avo i_d his probation being revokc^d, the 
Court invokes the full scope of its discretion to extend the 
defendant's probation for th€> maximum length permissible, the 
remaining full term of his sentence of 10 years. 
This Memorandum Decision Viil L stana as the Order of the Court:, 
denying the defendant's Mot L on to/Dismiss and extending his 
probation in the manner indicated afbove. 
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